This paper describes an analytically tractable model of balanced growth that is consistent with the observed size distribution of Þrms. Growth is the result of idiosyncratic Þrm productivity improvements, selection of successful Þrms, and imitation by potential entrants. The empirical phenomon of Zipf's law can be interpreted to mean that entry costs are high and that imitation is difficult. Lowering barriers to entry tends to speed up the rate at which selection improves aggregate productivity, and this increases the growth rate of the economy.
Introduction
This paper presents an analytically tractable model of growth resulting from Þrm-speciÞc preference and technology shocks, selective survival of successful Þrms, and imitation by entering Þrms. The model generates balanced growth and is consistent with salient features of the Þrm size distribution.
As many have noted, the size distribution of Þrms exhibits a striking pattern. Using 1997 data from the U.S. Census, Axtell (2001) Þnds that the log right tail probabilities of this distribution, with Þrm size measured by the log of employment, are on a virtual straight line with a slope of −1.059. Figure 1 below shows the data for 2001, together with a curve generated by a version of the model presented in this paper. A straight line Þtted using all size categories with at least 5 employees has a slope of −1.053. This evidence suggests that the Þrm size distribution is well approximated, over much of its range, by a (generalized) Pareto distribution with right tail probabilities of the form 1/S ζ , where S represents Þrm employment and ζ ≈ 1.053.
1
The remarkable Þt of this distribution has been documented and interpreted before, perhaps most notably by Simon and Bonini (1958) , Steindl (1965) , and Ijiri and Simon (1977) . As far back as Gibrat (1931) , researchers have related the shape of the observed size distribution to models of Þrm entry, random growth, and exit. The mechanism described in this paper is most like the one proposed for the city size distribution by Gabaix (1999) . 2 In contrast to this literature, this paper explains the observed Þrm size distributions in terms of primitives such as entry and Þxed costs, and the ease with which Þrms can imitate. The explanation is set in the context of a general equilibrium model, and this allows one to predict the effects of changes in various barriers to entry on the level and the growth rate of aggregate output. The model can also be extended in a 1 The data shown in Figure 1 Þrms that is not shown. The data are originally from the U.S. Census Bureau, and were obtained from the Small Business Administration internet site, and from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses site of the U.S. Census Bureau (the size categories 5,000-9,999 and 10,000 and over). The Þtted curve represents a mixture of Gamma distributions, as discussed in Section 6. Of course, any theoretical distribution with an unbounded support must fail to Þt the data for large enough Þrms. 2 Sutton (1997) surveys the literature on Þrm size and Gibrat's law: Þrm growth is independent of size. Gabaix (1999) contains extensive discussions of the literature on probability models that give rise to Pareto distributions, and their application in economics. Gabaix and Ioannides (2003) survey the literature on Zipf's law for cities.
tractable way to accommodate more extensive forms of heterogeneity (Luttmer [2004] ), making it a potentially useful tool for empirical research on the relation between Þrm heterogeneity and aggregate productivity. Firms in this paper are monopolistic competitors producing differentiated goods, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , using a linear technology. There is an entry cost for new Þrms, and it takes a Þxed cost per unit of time to continue an existing Þrm. A typical Þrm is subject to shocks to both productivity and the demand for its differentiated good. These shocks are Þrm-speciÞc and permanent. 3 A stationary Þrm size distribution arises if the average rate at which these shocks improve the proÞtability of incumbent Þrms is not too high relative to the rate at which the technology available to potential entrants improves over time.
One version of this economy is a model of technology adoption in which the technologies available to potential entrants improve at an exogenous rate. This rate determines the growth rate of the economy. If there is not too much heterogeneity among entrants, 3 See Melitz (2003) for a related model that features Þrm heterogeneity, monopolistic competition, together with entry and Þxed costs. Much of what follows can be shown also in an economy with perfectly competitive Þnal goods markets, decreasing returns at the Þrm level, and Þrm-speciÞc technology shocks. This would give rise to an economy similar to Lucas (1978) , Hopenhayn (1992) , Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) , and Hellwig and Irmen (2001) . Most data sets show a lot of heterogeneity across Þrms, even within narrowly deÞned industries. An advantage of the monopolistic competition formulation is that shocks to the demands for differentiated goods can be a source of Þrm heterogeneity, above and beyond Þrm-speciÞc technology shocks. then the equilibrium size distribution is well approximated, over much of its range, by a Pareto distribution. A tail index ζ slightly above 1 arises if the technologies available to entrants improve at a rate that is only slightly above the rate at which the technologies of incumbents improve. In this economy, a proportional increase in entry and Þxed costs lowers the level of aggregate output by reducing the number of Þrms and thereby the variety of goods produced. This is analogous to results for static economies in Krugman (1979) . The shape of the size distribution is not affected by proportional changes in entry and Þxed costs. A reduction in the entry cost alone does change the shape of the size distribution, although not its tail index. Lower entry costs lead to more Þrms and more variety, but the positive effect of this on the level of output is weakened by the fact that more inefficient Þrms will enter and survive. 4 A second version of this economy is a model of endogenous growth in which entering Þrms can imperfectly imitate incumbent Þrms. A potential entrant can pay an entry cost to sample at random from the population of incumbent Þrms. The entrant can then attempt to imitate the incumbent drawn from the population by introducing a new good with an initial productivity and market size that are scaled down relative to the productivity and market size of the incumbent. This spillover ensures that the technologies available to potential entrants are never so far behind those of incumbent Þrms that entry of new Þrms is not feasible. The economy has a continuum of stationary size distributions that are consistent with balanced growth. One possibility is for log Þrm size to follow a Gamma distribution. All possible size distributions have a tail similar to that of a Pareto distribution, with an analogous tail index ζ that must be slightly above 1 to Þt the data shown in Figure 1 . The main result for this economy is that ζ converges to 1 from above as the cost of entry becomes large relative to the Þxed cost of operating a Þrm, and as the extent to which new entrants lag behind incumbents in terms of productivity and market size becomes large.
To see why the asymptote ζ = 1 arises, note that the mean of a distribution with right tail probabilities of the order 1/S ζ grows without bound as ζ approaches 1 from above.
The combination of Þxed costs and constant returns implies that Þrm proÞtability is tied to size, and the fact that potential entrants imitate a randomly sampled incumbent ties the expected gains from entry to the average size of the incumbent population. In equilibrium, the higher the entry cost, the higher must be the expected gains from entry, and therefore the larger must be the size of the average Þrm. A size distribution such as shown in Figure 1 thus means that entry is very difficult, because of high entry costs, or because entrants lag so far behind incumbents in terms of productivity and market size. As in the version with exogenous growth, a proportional reduction in entry and Þxed costs increases the level of output in this economy. The effect of lowering entry costs alone is to lower the average size and proÞtability of Þrms. This is achieved in equilibrium by an increase in the turnover rate of Þrms, and this speeds up the selection mechanism by which aggregate productivity improves over time. As a result, the growth rate of the economy increases. A reduction in barriers to entry will, over time, have large effects on output when entrants can imitate incumbents. This is in sharp contrast to the level effect that arises when the technologies available to entrants are exogenous.
Related Literature Incumbent Þrms in this paper are engaged in a form of learningby-doing, and imitation by entering Þrms creates an externality, two features of growth emphasized by Arrow (1962) . 5 Following Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) , and Aghion and Howitt (1992), technological progress is embodied in Þrms, and Þrms have some market power. As in Romer (1990) , this takes the form of monopolistic competition. 6 The current paper differs in two important respects from Romer (1990) .
First, Þrms experience idiosyncratic permanent shocks to their technologies and to the demands for their differentiated commodities. This introduces selection as a mechanism by which the economy-wide distribution of productivity improves over time. Random growth and selection are crucial for matching the observed Þrm size distribution. Second, the mechanism that allows potential entrants to make use of the existing stock of ideas is made explicit. This yields an economic interpretation of the size distribution shown in Figure 1 : imitation is imperfect and must be very costly. 7 In Jovanovic (1982) , the effects of selection on the evolution of an industry eventually die out because Þrms are not subject to ongoing technology shocks. A key feature of the industry equilibrium studied by Hopenhayn (1992) is the assumption that Þrm 5 The more recent literature making use of these features includes Boldrin and Scheinkman (1988), Lucas (1988) , Stokey (1988) and Young (1991) 6 Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Boldrin and Levine (2000) construct models of endogenous growth that do not rely on imperfect competition or externalities. 7 Jovanovic (1982) emphasizes the role of selection in the evolution of an industry. Nelson productivity is stationary. This guarantees a stationary industry equilibrium, but there is no reason for the resulting size distribution to look like the one displayed in Figure 1 . In this paper, instead, all shocks to preferences and technology are permanent. Stationarity of the cross-sectional size distribution is a consequence of the spillover that relates the productivity of entrants to the distribution of productivity among incumbents. Gabaix (1999) shows how a geometric Brownian motion with a reßecting barrier gives rise to a power law and shows the precise circumstances under which this will lead to Zipf's law. He uses this to construct a model of cities and explain evidence on the size distribution of cities. In the presence of entry and Þxed costs, the process of Þrm entry and exit does not lead to a reßecting barrier, but to a "return process" according to which Þrms exit below some barrier and enter at a point above this barrier. The two processes are closely related, and the limiting argument used by Gabaix (1999) will be discussed below.
The economy described here has many elements in common with Klette and Kortum (2004), who build on Grossman and Helpman (1991) to construct a quality ladder model in which Þrm growth is the result of research and development choices made by Þrms. The economy grows because Þrms are able to improve on the quality of existing producers. As in this paper, entrants in Klette and Kortum (2004) are small relative to the average Þrm, Þrm growth satisÞes Gibrat's law, and Þrms are eventually driven out of business with probability one. The resulting size distribution, where size is measured by the number of goods produced by the Þrm, is logarithmic. This distribution is highly skewed, with a monotonically decreasing density. But a plot as in Figure 1 generates a curve that is concave and that does not asymptote to a straight line for large Þrm sizes. The right tail of the distribution is too thin.
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004) solve for the Þrm size distribution in an economy with many industries and many identical Þrms in each industry. Firms face a Þxed cost in every period and operate Cobb-Douglas technologies that exhibit decreasing returns. Human capital is industry speciÞc, and the number and size of Þrms in a particular industry at a point in time is determined by a static free-entry condition. It does not matter which of the inÞnitesimal Þrms in an industry exit when net exit from a particular industry is required. As a result, the model has no determinate implications for the joint age-size distribution of Þrms. In equilibrium, the industry-speciÞc human capital stock exhibits mean reversion, and this generates a stationary Þrm size distribution. If shocks to the human capital accumulation technology are log-normal, then the size distribution is log-normal. This seems to be at odds with Figure 1 . The log-normal distribution has many fewer large Þrms than are observed in the data.
Outline of the Paper The model of technology adoption is set up in Section 2. The size distribution is characterized in Section 3 and the balanced growth path is determined in Section 4. Imitation is introduced in Section 5, and the relations between entry costs, the size distribution, and the growth rate of the economy are described. Section 6 allows for multiple industries with different cost structures and growth rates, and shows how Figure 1 can be interpreted in such an economy. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
Technology Adoption

Consumers
Time is continuous and indexed by t. There is a continuum of consumers alive at any point in time. The population size at time t is He ηt , and the population growth rate η is non-negative. During their lifetimes, consumers supply one unit of labor at every point in time. There is a representative consumer with preferences over rates of dynastic consumption {C t } t≥0 of a composite good, deÞned by the utility function:
The discount rate ρ and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/γ are positive. The composite good is made up of a continuum of differentiated commodities. Preferences over these commodities are additively separable with weights that deÞne the type of a commodity. This implies that all commodities of the same type and trading at the same price are consumed at the same rate. Let c t (u, p) be consumption at time t of a commodity of type u that trades at a price p. In equilibrium, there will be a measure M t of commodities that are available at time t, deÞned on the set of commodity types and prices. The composite good is a version of the one speciÞed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . For some ω ∈ (0, 1):
The type u of a commodity can be viewed as measure of its quality. The level of c t (u, p) is chosen to minimize the cost of acquiring C t . This implies that:
where P t is the price index:
The price elasticity of the demand for commodity (u, p) is −1/(1 − ω), and the implied expenditure share is u(p/P t ) −ω/(1−ω) .
The representative consumer faces a standard present-value budget constraint. The consumer's wealth consists of claims to Þrms and labor income. Along the balanced growth path constructed below, per capita consumption and wages grow at a common rate κ. The paths of per capita consumption and wages are denoted by C t e −ηt = Ce κt and w t = we κt . When the composite good is used as the numeraire, the interest rate is constant and given by r = ρ + γκ. The following assumption ensures that the present value of aggregate consumption and labor income is Þnite.
Assumption 1
The growth rates η and κ satisfy η ≥ 0 and ρ + γκ > κ + η.
This assumption implies that ρ > (1 − γ)κ, and thus utility is Þnite.
Firms
A Þrm is deÞned by its unique access to a technology for producing a particular differentiated commodity. At age a, a Þrm that was set up at time t uses labor L t,a to produce z t,a L t,a units of a differentiated commodity of quality u t,a . Given a price p t,a , the revenues of the Þrm are given by R t,a = p t,a z t,a L t,a /P t , in units of the composite good. The demand function for type-u t,a commodities implies that these revenues can be written as:
where
1/ω combines the state of preferences and technology. Firm revenues vary with aggregate consumption, the weight u t,a of its output in the utility function, and its productivity level z t,a . With some abuse of terminology, the combination of quality and quantity measured by Z t,a will be referred to simply as productivity. The productivities Z t,a are assumed to evolve independently across Þrms, according to:
where {W t,a } a≥0 is a standard Brownian motion and Z is an initial condition. 8 Note that Z t,0 = Ze θt is the initial productivity of a new Þrm at time t. Thus θ is the rate at which the productivity of entering Þrms grows over time. After entry, the trend of log productivity is determined by ϑ. The difference between θ and ϑ is a key determinant of the Þrm size distribution. It will be made endogenous in Section 5. An existing Þrm can be continued only at a cost equal to λ F units of labor per unit of time. The Þrm must exit if this Þxed cost is not paid, and exit is irreversible. One interpretation is that it is costly to preserve the information accumulated as a result of past Þrm-speciÞc shocks to preferences and technology, and that this information is lost as soon as the required costs are not incurred. 9 Measured in units of the composite good, the value V t [Z] at time t of a Þrm with initial productivity Ze θt is given by:
he maximization is subject to (4) and (5), and subject to the restriction that production and exit decisions only depend on the available information.
The aggregate supply of labor grows at a rate η, and every Þrm must use at least λ F units of labor to stay in business. Along the balanced growth path, the number of Þrms grows at the rate η. Entry and exit generates time-t cross-sectional distributions of labor inputs L t−a,a and productivities relative to trend Z t−a,a e −θt that are time invariant.
Since the number of Þrms grows at a rate η, the growth rate κ of per capita consumption must also be the growth rate of average revenues per Þrm. Together with (4) this gives:
Population growth implies growth in the number of differentiated commodities. This adds to the growth rate θ of productivity, with a slope that is large when substitution between these commodities is difficult.
Production Decisions
Firms choose variable labor to maximize variable proÞts R t,a − w t+a L t,a , subject to (4). The optimal choice is:
C t+a (7) 9 Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) assume perfect competition together with decreasing returns to variable inputs and interpret λ F as the cost of a managerial Þxed factor, along the lines of Lucas (1978) . Much of what follows continues to hold for such an alternative model.
Together with (5) and (6) this implies that, along the balanced growth path, labor and revenues measured in units of labor do not depend on calendar time. In particular, the revenues net of Þxed and variable costs can be written as:
where s a equals:
and where S[Z] is deÞned by:
Both revenues and variable labor inputs are proportional to w t+a λ F e s a . The variable s a can thus be viewed as a measure of Þrm size relative to Þxed costs. If s a = 0, then variable revenues just cover Þxed costs. It follows from (5) and (8) that Þrm size evolves with age according to ds a = µda + σdW t,a , where:
Firm size has a negative drift when productivity inside the Þrm is expected to grow more slowly than the productivity of new entrants. Note that the differences in these growth rates and the variance of productivity shocks are greatly magniÞed when the differentiated goods are close substitutes. The function S[Z] deÞned in (9) plays an important role in the rest of the paper. Along the balanced growth path, where (6) holds, it relates the de-trended productivity of any Þrm to its size. More precisely, e S[Z] is the size of any Þrm with productivity Ze θt at time t, relative to its Þxed costs at time t. In particular, it is the size relative to Þxed costs of a new Þrm entering with a de-trended initial productivity Z.
The Exit Decision
The presence of Þxed costs implies a minimum size. Firms with very low productivity choose to exit since they face only a small probability of ever recovering the Þxed costs required to continue the Þrm. The value of a Þrm of size s relative to its current Þxed costs is equal to:
The value of a Þrm entering at time t with initial productivity Z is equal to
). This depends on the level of wages directly via w t , and indirectly via
Assumption 2 Preference and technology parameters satisfy ρ + γκ
Assumption 1 implies that r > κ, and thus the Þxed cost of operating a Þrm forever is Þnite. Assumption 2 means that r > κ + µ + σ 2 /2, and this implies that the revenues of such a policy are also Þnite. Together, these assumptions are sufficient to ensure that the value of a Þrm is Þnite. The value function V (s) must satisfy the following Bellman equation in the range of s where a Þrm is not shut down:
where:
The return to owning a Þrm consists of a capital gain κ + AV (s)/V (s) and a dividend yield (e s − 1)/V (s). It is optimal to shut down a Þrm when its size s falls below some threshold b. Given that the Þrm is shut down at b, it must be that the value of a Þrm is zero at that point. This implies the boundary condition V (b) = 0. The optimal threshold must be such that V is differentiable at b, and so DV (b) = 0. A further boundary condition follows from the fact that the value function cannot exceed the value of a Þrm that operates without Þxed costs. This implies that V (s) must lie below
With these boundary conditions, the Bellman equation has only one solution:
The exit barrier b is determined by:
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that ξ > 0 and that b is well deÞned. As expected, V (s) is strictly increasing on [b, ∞). It will be useful to note that V (x + b) is increasing in ξ, and that V (x + b) goes to zero as ξ goes to zero, for all x. This will happen when µ becomes large and negative. If the productivity of new entrants grows very quickly, then the value of being an incumbent at any given distance x away from the exit barrier will be very small.
Entry
New Þrms can be set up at a cost that is linear in the entry rate. Entry at a rate of l Þrms per unit of time costs λ E l units of labor per unit of time. Entry results in a draw of Z from a distribution G. At time t, a draw Z yields an initial productivity Ze θt and thus an initial size S[Z]. Along the balanced growth path, entry takes place at all times. This means that the proÞts from entry must be zero:
The distribution G is taken to be exogenous until imitation is introduced in Section 5. The only assumption needed here is that the implied value of entry is Þnite.
Assumption 3
The initial productivity distribution G satisÞes:
The value of entry depends on steady-state wages and aggregate consumption via S[Z].
Recall from (9) is increasing in λ E . In equilibrium, the initial size and productivity of Þrms must be high when entry is costly.
The Distribution of Firm Characteristics
There is a continuum of inÞnitesimal Þrms. The underlying stochastic structure is assumed to be such that probability distributions for individual Þrm size can be interpreted as cross-sectional size distributions for the whole continuum of Þrms. Along the balanced growth path to be constructed, there is a time-invariant crosssectional distribution of Þrm size. Firms enter and exit at constant aggregate rates in such a way that the aggregate measure of Þrms expands at the rate η. A time-invariant size distribution will result if η is positive, or if η is zero and µ is negative. In any equilibrium, the distribution of Þrm size, measured by e s , must also have a Þnite mean.
The following assumption will turn out to be necessary and sufficient for this to be the case, given that η is non-negative.
Assumption 4 The productivity parameters satisfy
Note that µ + σ 2 /2 is the drift of the size variable e s a . Thus Assumption 4 means that the size of a typical incumbent Þrm is not expected to grow faster than the population growth rate. If η is zero then µ must be negative, but otherwise it can be positive. Although age does not directly affect Þrm behavior, it is convenient to include age with size as a state variable. Age increases deterministically with a unit drift, and size has drift µ and diffusion coefficient σ. The measure of Þrms, deÞned on the set of possible ages a and Þrm sizes s, grows at a rate η. The density of this measure at date t can be written as m(a, s)Ie ηt , where Ie ηt is the number of new Þrms entering per unit of time. The market clearing conditions that will determine the balanced growth path are linear in m, and this makes it convenient not to normalize m to be a probability density.
The density m(a, s)Ie ηt , viewed as a function of the state (a, s) and time t, must satisfy the Kolmogorov forward equation. 11 The resulting partial differential equation for m is given by:
for all a > 0 and s > b. The Þrst term on the right-hand side of (14) reßects the fact that the measure of Þrms grows over time. The remaining two terms describe how m(a, s) evolves as a result of stochastic changes in the sizes of individual Þrms. Firms use at least λ F units of labor, and so the measure of Þrms has to be Þnite in any equilibrium. This amounts to a Þrst boundary condition for (14) . As age goes to zero, the size distribution implied by m must approach the size distribution among entrants. This distribution, denoted by F , follows from the productivity distribution G at entry via G(Z) = F (S [Z] ). This gives a further boundary condition:
for all s > b. The remaining boundary condition is given by the requirement that:
for all a > 0. This condition arises from the fact that Þrms exit at b while none enter starting with a size below b.
Lemma 1
The solution to (14) subject to the boundary conditions (15)- (16) is:
for all a > 0 and all s > b, where:
and where φ is the standard normal density.
The two terms that deÞne e −ηa ψ(a, s|x) both satisfy (14) . For small values of a, the Þrst term approximates a normal probability density that puts almost all probability close to s = x. The second term converges to zero as a goes to zero, since s + x > 2b. This implies the boundary condition (15) . The fact that ψ(a, b|x) = 0 for a > 0 implies (16) . Together with η ≥ 0, Assumption 4 suffices to ensure that e −ηa ψ(a, s|x) can be integrated over all a > 0 and s > b so that the overall measure of Þrms is Þnite. The following remark will be used to further characterize m.
Remark The roots of the characteristic polynomial η + µz − z 2 σ 2 /2 of (14) are:
Since η ≥ 0, both roots are real, and Assumption 4 is equivalent to ζ > 1. If η = 0, then ζ simpliÞes to ζ = −µ/(σ 2 /2). The root ζ * is non-negative, and positive if and only if η > 0. If µ < 0, then ζ * /η converges to 1/(−µ) as η goes to zero.
Observe that m(a, s) reduces to e −ηa ψ(a, s|x) if F is replaced by a distribution concentrated at x. This means that e −ηa ψ(a, s|x) is the density of Þrm age and size among all
Þrms with the same initial size x. Let π(a, s|x) be the associated probability density. Integrating e −ηa ψ(a, s|x) to obtain the normalizing constant yields:
Combining this with the above solution for m(a, s) gives:
Thus m(a, s) is a weighted sum of the densities π(a, s|x)dF (x), with weights that are increasing in the distance of initial size x from the exit barrier b. In the special case of η = 0, these weights reduce to (x − b)/(−µ), which is the expected life span of a new Þrm entering with size x. Relatively large entering Þrms stay around longer, and appear more often in the population than suggested by the size distribution of entrants.
The Age Distribution
The shape of the age distribution of Þrms implied by m depends on the size distribution F of entering Þrms. If heterogeneity among entrants is small relative to heterogeneity in the overall population, then the age distribution will look much like the one obtained by conditioning on a typical x > b. Integrating π(a, s|x) over s gives the age density among Þrms with the same size at entry. The result is:
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. If there is no population growth, then the density π(a|x) can also be interpreted as the survivor function of a cohort of Þrms, scaled by the average life span of a Þrm. 12 It can be shown that this survivor function has a hump-shaped hazard rate. Any entrant with x > b stays around for some time, and then the negative drift µ will start to generate a high rate of exit. Among older Þrms, more will be large as a result of a string of positive productivity shocks, and this implies a lower exit rate. If x is close to b, then the hazard rate will be decreasing in age over much of its domain. This is consistent with the declining hazard rates in the US Census of Manufactures reported by Samuelson (1988, 1989) . 13 
The Size Distribution
It follows from (17) that the Þrm size density is a weighted average of the density π(s|x) of size given initial size. For any x > b, integrating π(a, s|x) over all ages gives: 12 The size density at age a of Þrms of the same cohort and initial size x then satisÞes (14) with η = 0, and the age-zero boundary condition is a point mass at x. From this the result follows. 13 The results of Samuelson (1988, 1989 ) are based on Þve-year census cohorts observed at Þve-year intervals. Caves (1998) discusses the literature on Þrm exit rates and cites additional studies documenting hazard rates that decline with age, as well as a study by Brüderl, Preisendörfer and Ziegler (1992) based on monthly observations of a cohort of new Þrms in the Munich (Germany) area that reports a hump-shaped hazard function.
for all s ≥ b. This is a well-deÞned density for any ζ > 0 and ζ * ≥ 0. The mean of Þrm size, when size is measured by e s , is Þnite if and only if ζ > 1. As noted earlier, this is guaranteed by Assumption 4. An example of π(s|x) is given in Figure 2 . The kink at s = x is a result of the entry that takes place at x. Conditional on s ≥ x, the density of e s implied by (18) If all new Þrms enter with the same initial productivity, then F is a point mass at some initial size x. In that case, (17) implies that π(s|x) is the Þrm size density. This density matches the data presented in Figure 1 if x − b is small and ζ ≈ 1.05. More generally, suppose that F is a distribution with few Þrms that are much larger than the exit barrier. Then m(s) will inherit the exponentially declining tail common to all π(s|x) over most of the support (b, ∞). The deviations from linearity seen in Figure 1 occur for small Þrms: there are fewer of them than would be the case if the size distribution was Pareto.
14 Suppose population growth rates are zero. Consider the limiting distribution obtained by letting x go to b. This turns the proÞtability process of a dynasty of Þrms into a Brownian motion with a negative drift and a reßecting barrier at b. The resulting distribution for e s is a Pareto distribution on e s ≥ e b with mean e b ζ/(ζ − 1). In Gabaix (1999), e s is the size of a city relative to the average city size. This must have mean 1, and so ζ = 1/(1 − e b ). The explanation given in Gabaix (1999) for Zipf's law for relative city sizes is that b must be very small. 15 In independent work Miao (2004) derives the same size distribution in a related model of industry equilibrium in which the entry distribution F is assumed to be uniform over an interval.
Since π(s|x) is upward-sloping on the interval (b, x), this is exactly what is predicted when F tends to have most of its mass close to the exit barrier.
Random Growth and Selection
To emphasize the importance of randomness in shaping the Þrm size distribution, it is instructive to consider what happens as the variance of productivity shocks goes to zero. For simplicity, suppose that η = 0. Assumption 4 then requires µ < 0 and at σ 2 = 0 one obtains ξ = (r − κ)/ |µ| and b = 0. Firms exit immediately when they no longer break even. There is no option value that would justify continuing to operate a loss-making Þrm. An entering Þrm starts with size x, and this size will then decline linearly to 0, at which point the Þrm exits. As σ 2 goes to 0, the tail index ζ grows without bound. Using (18) one can verify that the size distribution converges to a uniform distribution on (0, x). In this limiting economy, the largest and most proÞtable Þrm conditional on initial size is the most recent entrant. This is in sharp contrast to what is found in the data (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1988, 1989] , Caves [1998] ). The randomness in productivity growth generates a selection mechanism by which the typical Þrm can be much larger and productive than recent entrants.
The Balanced Growth Path
Per capita consumption and wages grow at the rate κ determined in (6) . The resulting interest rate is r = ρ + γκ, and together with the κ this pins down the value function V (s). As noted earlier, the zero-proÞt condition then determines (C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) and the function S[Z] deÞned in (9) . The preceding section shows how this determines the size distribution of Þrms.
To complete the construction of the balanced growth path, it remains to determine the levels of per capita consumption and wages, as well as the level of Þrm entry I. These variables are determined by goods and labor market clearing conditions. Let L E e ηt , L F e ηt and Le ηt denote the amounts of labor assigned to, respectively, setting up new Þrms, Þxed costs to operate existing Þrms, and production. It follows from the Þrm decision rules (7)- (9) that:
Together with the labor market clearing condition L E + L F + L = H, this determines the rate of entry I. Aggregate output is the sum of Þrm revenues. The decision rules (7)- (9) imply that aggregate output Y e (κ+η)t satisÞes:
In combination with the goods market clearing condition C = Y , this determines the ratio C/w. Since (C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) is determined by the zero-proÞt condition, this pins down C and w. This leads to the Þrst part of the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If Assumptions 1-4 hold, then there exists a balanced growth path. A proportional reduction in the entry and Þxed cost parameters (λ E , λ F ) raises the level of output with an elasticity (1 − ω)/ω.
At t = 0, the distribution of productivities available to potential entrants is G(Z). At that same time, there will be some measure of incumbent Þrms with given levels of productivity. The balanced growth path of Proposition 1 will be an equilibrium if at t = 0 the density of productivity among incumbent Þrms is m
(S[Z]) |DS[Z]|. What happens for different initial conditions is not known.
To see the second part of Proposition 1, observe that a proportional reduction in (λ E , λ F ) does not affect the zero-proÞt condition. The function S[Z] and the size density m(s) therefore do not change. It follows from (19) and the labor market clearing condition that I increases in such a way that (λ E , λ F )I remains constant. Together with (20) and C = Y this implies that C/w remains unchanged. Since S[Z] is proportional to (1/λ F )(C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) , it follows that 1/w must increase with an elasticity (1 − ω)/ω. This is also the effect on consumption. Lower setup and Þxed costs imply a larger number of Þrms. Since Þrms are identiÞed with distinct differentiated goods, this means a larger number of goods. The elasticity (1 − ω)/ω measures the increase in composite consumption arising from this increase in variety. Note that (19) and (20) depend on (λ E , λ F )/H when labor and output are expressed in per capita terms. Also, the function S[Z] can be written in terms of C/H and λ F /H. Thus an increase in the size of the population is equivalent to a proportional reduction in the setup and Þxed costs. The resulting elasticity (1−ω)/ω of per capita consumption with respect to H corresponds to the one obtained for the growth rate κ in (6) . The beneÞts of lower setup and Þxed costs and larger population sizes derived here replicate those obtained for a static economy by Krugman (1979) .
Imperfect Imitation
The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is well deÞned only if ζ > 1, and the data in Figure 1 suggest that ζ should be close to one. The parameter ζ is a function of the population growth rate η, the curvature parameter ω of the utility function, and the technology parameters [θ, ϑ, ς]. So far, these parameters have been taken as exogenous, and the model cannot explain Figure 1 unless they happen to be of just the right magnitude to imply ζ ≈ 1.05. Recall from (5) and (8) that θ is the growth rate of new Þrm productivity, and also the rate at which the cross-sectional distribution of productivity trends up over time. This section makes θ endogenous and gives conditions under which the distribution shown in Figure 1 will arise.
By paying Þxed costs, incumbent Þrms can continue production and generate stochastic productivity improvements. The productivity of surviving Þrms will tend to grow forever as long as ϑ is not too small. If new Þrms had to start from the same level of productivity as existing Þrms entered with in the past, then the value of entry would eventually become too small to justify the cost of entry. The high productivity of successful survivors would drive up wages beyond the level at which it would be proÞtable for new Þrms to enter. The size distribution of Þrms would be non-stationary.
To avoid this outcome, some mechanism is needed that allows potential entrants to beneÞt from the productivity improvements obtained by incumbents. The mechanism proposed here is imitation. Suppose potential entrants can pay the entry cost λ E to select a random incumbent Þrm and then adopt a scaled-down version of its technology. More precisely, if the randomly selected Þrm at time t has a productivity Xe θt , then the potential entrant obtains a technology capable of producing a new good with productivity Ze θt = Xe θt−δ(1−ω)/ω . The parameter δ measures how much the productivity of the potential entrant will be below that of the incumbent. It is taken to be non-negative, so that imitation is imperfect, and imitation is difficult if δ is large. The implied initial size of the potential entrant is S[Z] = S[X] − δ, and the entry attempt will be successful if this exceeds b. Observe how random sampling and imitation tie the expected size and proÞtability of a potential entrant to the average size and proÞtability of incumbents. This sets up strong incentives for entry when incumbents become large and proÞtable on average. The result is a stationary size distribution with a well deÞned and Þnite average Þrm size.
16 16 In Eaton and Eckstein (1997), knowledge spillovers across existing cities provide the mechanism by which the size distribution of cities is prevented from spreading out. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002) allow all Þrms to copy, imperfectly, from the whole population of
Stationary Size Distributions
Assume the cross-sectional distribution of productivity is stationary when productivity is de-trended by some growth rate θ. Suppose the resulting size distribution has a probability density f(s). The mechanism by which potential entrants obtain a new technology implies a size density for entering Þrms equal to DF (x) = f (x+δ). Combined with π(s|x), this initial size density in turn implies a size density for all Þrms via (17) . It follows that the probability density f (s) must satisfy the Þxed point condition:
for all s ≥ b. Observe that this condition only depends on the parameters ζ, ζ * and δ. By using a series expansion of f to evaluate the two sides of (21) and equating coefficients one can construct the set of sufficiently smooth densities that satisfy (21) . The resulting Þxed points are described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose δ ≥ 0, and let π(s|x) be deÞned by (18) , for some ζ > 0 and ζ * ≥ 0. (21) is solved by:
for any α > 0 and β ≥ α that satisfy:
The condition ζ > ζ * /(1 + δζ * ) is necessary and sufficient for (23) to have a solution. The constraint β ≥ α is without loss of generality since α and β enter symmetrically in (22) and (23) . Given this constraint, the right tail probabilities of f (s) behave like e −αs for large s, and α will again be referred to as the tail index of the distribution. The mean of e s implied by f (s) is Þnite if and only if α > 1.
Consider a density of the form (22) with α = β. This means that the size density is given by the Gamma density α 2 (s − b)e −α(s−b) . The tail index that solves (23) is then given by α = −µ/σ 2 when δ = 0, and by:
Þrms. Here, the spillover is only from incumbents to potential entrants. Incumbents are locked into their idiosyncratic productivity processes and are not assumed to be able to imitate the successes of other incumbent Þrms. The result is that incumbents eventually exit with probability one. when δ > 0. For large δ this tail index is essentially the same as the tail index ζ of π(s|x). The expression for α shown in (24) is decreasing in µ, and thus increasing in the growth rate θ. The higher the average growth rate θ of productivity in the population, relative to the drift ϑ of surviving incumbents, the more aggregate productivity growth must be due to selection, and this implies a size distribution with a thinner tail. It will be useful to note that a Gamma distribution with a thick tail stochastically dominates a Gamma distribution with a thin tail in a Þrst-order sense.
The Balanced Growth Path and Zipf's Law
The size density f (s) constructed in Lemma 2 is a function of the assumed productivity growth rate θ, through its dependence on π(s|x) and the parameters ζ and ζ * . The value function V (s) is also a function of θ, via the drift parameter µ, as well as via the equilibrium interest rate r and the growth rate κ of per capita consumption and wages. Taken together, this means that the expected proÞts from entry are a function of θ.
The only values of θ that are consistent with balanced growth are those for which these proÞts are zero:
Observe that the equilibrium conditions (21) and (25) only depend on θ and f, and equilibrium variables that are themselves functions only of θ and f . To complete the construction of a balanced growth path, Þx some growth rate θ and a density f that satisfy (21) and (25) . As before, the relation between Þrm size and productivity is summarized by the function S[Z]. Recall from (9) that e S[Z] is proportional to (C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) . The location of the productivity density f (S[Z]) |DS(Z)| is therefore determined by the log of (C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) . On a balanced growth path, the density f(S[Z]) |DS(Z)| must correspond to the density of productivity among incumbent Þrms at the initial date. This requirement determines the equilibrium value of (C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) , provided that the distribution of productivity at the initial date is consistent with balanced growth. As in the case of exogenous growth, goods and labor market clearing conditions determine the ratio C/w and the rate I at which Þrms attempt to enter. Together with (C/w)/w ω/(1−ω) this gives C and w separately, and the economy will be on a balanced growth path if the number of Þrms at the initial date corresponds to the number implied by f and I.
The following proposition shows that this construction works if consumers discount the future enough. Precise conditions and a proof are given in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose the population growth rate η and the drift ϑ of technological progress among incumbents are non-negative. If the discount rate ρ is large enough, then there exists a continuum of balanced growth paths with size distributions of the form (22)- (23) . The tail index α of the size distribution converges to one -Zipf's Lawas the ratio λ E /λ F of entry over Þxed costs grows without bound.
The existence of a balanced growth path and the circumstances in which Zipf's law arises are most transparent in the special case of logarithmic utility. This case implies that r = ρ + κ, simplifying the dependence of the value of a Þrm on θ. For Þxed x, the value V (x + b) is then unambiguously decreasing in θ. Higher productivity growth in the population drives incumbents at a given distance from the exit barrier out of business more quickly, and this implies a low Þrm value. Consider the case α = β. As noted earlier, higher productivity growth then also implies a size distribution with thinner tails, or a downward shift (in the sense of Þrst-order stochastic dominance) in the distribution implied by f(x + b + δ). Since V (x + b) is an increasing function of x, it follows that the right-hand side of the zero-proÞt condition (25) is decreasing in θ. 17 Equivalently, the expected value of entry is decreasing in the tail index α. It is not difficult to show that the value of entry goes to zero for very large α. Finally, the dominant term in the value function V (x+b) is the Þrm size variable e x , and this implies that the expected value of entry grows without bound as the tail index α approaches 1 from above. The right-hand side of the zero-proÞt condition is therefore as shown in Figure 3 , with a vertical asymptote at α = 1 and a horizontal asymptote at 0. From this the results of Proposition 2 follow. If the utility function exhibits more curvature than logarithmic utility, then the value function continues to be monotone in α for high enough discount rates. But if γ < 1, then the discount factor 1/(r − κ) is increasing in κ and thus also in θ and α. This can outweigh the negative effect on the value function of a larger gap θ − ϑ between productivity growth in the population and the drift of incumbent productivity. The value of a Þrm may, over some range, increase with the growth rate of productivity in the population. This can make the expected value of entry non-monotone in θ and α. The proof given in the appendix shows that a balanced growth path does nevertheless exist for high enough discount rates ρ. 
Barriers to Entry and Growth
The equilibrium conditions (21) and (25), and therefore the growth rate θ, are independent of the scale of the entry and Þxed costs (λ E , λ F ). As in the case of exogenous growth, lowering both costs at the same time simply increases the level of output with an elasticity (1−ω)/ω. The effects of changing only barriers to entry -the entry cost λ E or the difficulty of imitation δ-are described in the following corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary Suppose the conditions of Proposition 2 hold and consider equilibria with α = β. The growth rate θ of productivity in the population is decreasing in the entry cost parameter λ E and the imitation parameter δ when γ ≥ 1, and for sufficiently large entry costs when γ < 1.
For γ ≥ 1, this result follows from the fact that the value of entry, as illustrated in Figure  3 , is decreasing in the tail index α. A higher entry cost λ E implies a higher equilibrium value of entry, and thus a lower equilibrium value of α, and a lower θ. Similarly, a larger δ implies a lower equilibrium value of α since the expected value of entry is lower when imitation is more difficult. 18 Given that the right-hand side of (24) is increasing in δ and decreasing in µ, this implies a lower growth rate θ. For γ < 1 these conclusions continue to hold provided entry costs are high. High entry costs imply that α must be close to 1 and the expected value of entry can be shown to be monotone for all α close enough to the asymptote α = 1. The corollary says that lowering entry costs will tend to increase the growth rate of the economy. If imitation is very difficult, then (24) implies that α ≈ ζ, and if there is also no population growth, then ζ = −2µ/σ 2 . Using the deÞnitions of µ and σ 2 given in (10), this yields:
The drift of incumbent productivity is ϑ, and the second term in (26) captures the effect of selection on productivity growth in the population of Þrms. The effect of selection on θ can be substantial if the differentiated commodities are close substitutes. For example, if the elasticity of substitution between differentiated commodities is 10, or ω = .9, then ς = .05 (ς = .10) implies that selection adds at least 1.125% (4.5%) to the growth rate of productivity in the population. Lower barriers to entry imply smaller Þrms and this corresponds to higher values of α. By (26) , this means faster productivity growth in the population. Incumbent productivity drifts up at a rate ϑ in any case, but the lower barriers to entry generate more Þrm turnover and this increases the effect of selection.
Heterogeneity Across Industries
All Þrms discussed so far face demand curves with the same elasticity −1/(1 − ω), and productivity processes with the same drift and diffusion parameters ϑ and ς. No doubt, the degree to which the differentiated commodities produced in an industry are substitutable differs across industries, as do the typical rates of technological progress. Entry and Þxed costs and the difficulty of imitation are unlikely to be the same across industries either. 19 Given such heterogeneity, does the model still predict a size distribution for all Þrms that looks like the one shown in Figure 1 ? Suppose consumption consists of N different goods, each of which is a composite of a continuum of differentiated commodities. Industries are identiÞed with different composite goods. As before, different Þrms in an industry produce distinct differentiated commodities. SpeciÞcally, suppose consumption is given by the Cobb-Douglas aggregate C t = Q N n=1 C νn n,t , where C n,t satisÞes (1) with ω replaced by an industry-speciÞc curvature parameter ω n . The share parameters ν n are between zero and one and add up to one.
Idiosyncratic Þrm productivity in industry n is assumed to follow (5), with [θ, ϑ, ς] replaced by [θ n , ϑ n , ς n ].
Along any balanced growth path, aggregate consumption of the composite good produced by industry n will be C n,t = C n e (κn+η)t , where κ n is deÞned in terms of θ n and ω n as in (6) . Aggregate consumption will be C t = Ce (κ+η)t and the growth rate κ of per capita consumption is simply the average of the industry growth rates weighted by expenditure-shares:
Wages also grow at this rate. The price index for aggregate consumption is P t = Q N n=1 (P n,t /ν n ) ν n , where P n,t is the price index for the composite good of industry n, deÞned as in (3). The relative prices P n,t /P t must be given by (P n /P )e (κ−κn)t , since expenditure shares are constant. Let λ F,n be the Þxed cost required to continue a Þrm in industry n. A calculation along the lines of (7)- (9) implies that the relation between productivity and size in industry n is given by:
The gross revenues at time t of a Þrm in industry n with a productivity Ze θnt are given by w t λ F,n e Sn [Z] . The (logarithmic) size of such a Þrm follows a Brownian motion with drift µ n and diffusion coefficient σ n deÞned as in (10), using the industry-speciÞc parameters ω n and [θ n , ϑ n , ς n ]. Firms choose to follow the same stopping rule as before, exiting when size falls below an industry-speciÞc barrier b n deÞned as in (12) . The size distributions in all industries are therefore of the form derived in Section 3. Suppose Þrms can choose which industry to enter, and then, at a cost of λ E,n units of labor, attempt to imitate incumbents in that industry along the lines of Section 5. The extent to which entrants lag behind incumbents in industry n is measured by δ n . Potential entrants can direct their entry attempts to a speciÞc industry, but imitation of Þrms in the chosen industry is imperfect, as before.
This setup leads to equilibrium conditions for the industry growth rate θ n and size density f n that are exactly analogous to (21) and (25) . The value functions V n appearing in equilibrium conditions analogous to (25) depend on µ n and the difference r−κ between the interest rate and the aggregate growth rate κ. Since κ depends on an expenditureweighted average of the industry growth rates θ n , this gives a system of N equilibrium conditions in N unknown growth rates θ n . For general γ, the analysis of this system is more complicated than the analysis that led to Proposition 2. But r −κ = ρ when utility is logarithmic, and then the equations uncouple: the zero-proÞt condition for industry n only depends on the growth rate θ n of industry productivity and the size density f n . As a result, the proof of Proposition 2 applies. In particular, industries with high ratios λ E,n /λ F,n will have tail indices α n close to 1, and, ceteris paribus, growth rates θ n that are not far above ϑ n . The overall size density will be a weighted average of the industry size densities f n . Since e s measures net Þrm revenues relative to Þxed costs, and λ F,n measures industry-n Þxed costs in units of labor, it follows that e s λ F,n /(1 − ω n ) measures gross Þrm revenues in units of labor, in industry n. Therefore, if size is measured by gross Þrm revenues, then the overall size density is of the form:
for weights p n that add up to one. These weights are proportional to the numbers of Þrms in each industry. The number of Þrms in industry n times the average revenues in that industry should equal the value of aggregate consumption of the composite good produced in that industry, or ν n times the value of aggregate consumption. It follows that the number of Þrms in industry n is proportional to:
Thus, if the goods produced by different industries have similar expenditure shares, then every industry-speciÞc size density is weighted simply by the reciprocal of the average Þrm size in the industry. The curve shown in Figure 1 represents the size distribution of an economy with N = 20 and industries that differ only in terms of the volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The standard deviation for industry n is taken to be ς n = .005n. The population growth rate is η = .01. Utility is logarithmic and the subjective discount rate is given by ρ = .05. In all industries, ω n = .9, implying a substitution elasticity equal to 9. The entry cost parameter is λ E = 2 while the present value of Þxed costs incurred in perpetuity is equal to λ F /ρ = 1.4. The imitation parameter is δ = 2, and thus δ(1 − ω)/ω = 2/9. New Þrms are about 20% less productive than the incumbents they try to imitate. Given that new goods are such close substitutes to existing goods, this leads to initial Þrm sizes of only about 14% of the size of incumbents. Figure 4 shows how the industry tail indices, growth rates and numbers of Þrms vary with the standard deviation of productivity growth. The tail indices range from 1.37 to 1.02, and the differences θ n − ϑ n range from about 1% for industry 1 to around 8.6% for industry N . As a result of a stronger selection effect, industries with the largest productivity shocks grow about 7.6% faster than the ones with smallest productivity shocks. 20 Close to 30% of all Þrms are in the slow growing industry with tail index 1.37 while only .2% of Þrms are in the fast growing industry with tail index 1.02. But these Þrms tend to be larger and dominate the shape of the right tail of the distribution. As a result, the model provides a close Þt to the slope −1.05 shown in Figure 1 . Given a Þnite number of industries, the right tail of the size density will be determined by the industry with a value of α n closest to one. In Figure 1 , the slope of the log right tail probabilities with respect to log size is constant and only slightly above −1 over much of the range of the data. This will tend to be the result of (28)- (29) if there are sufficiently many industries in which α n is close to one, say, because imitation is difficult or entry costs are high.
The only heterogeneity across industries assumed in Figures 1 and 4 is in the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Because of this, larger Þrms tend to be in industries with high productivity growth. If, instead, industries only differ in terms of entry costs, then large Þrms would tend to be in the industries with high entry costs. Other possible sources of variation are the drift of incumbent productivity growth, within-industry 20 Note that variation in ς 2 n dominates the equilibrium variation in α n ς 2 n , and the approximation (26) then indicates that industries with more variable productivity shocks must grow faster. substitutability of the differentiated commodities, Þxed costs, and the difficulty of imitation. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004) present evidence that size distributions differ across industries and suggest an interpretation. Further research is needed to see if and how this variation can be accounted for using the model economy described here, possibly augmented with the additional sources of within-industry heterogeneity described in Luttmer (2004).
Concluding Remarks
If new entrants can imitate incumbents, then growth is rapid when barriers to entry are low. The engine of growth is experimentation by Þrms, combined with selection. Lucky Þrms receive another draw and unlucky ones exit and are replaced by more productive Þrms. Firms are experiments that can be cut short and replaced by new ones when they do not perform well. Reducing the cost of entry speeds up the rate of economywide experimentation and raises the growth rate of the economy. The resulting size distribution is stationary because potential entrants can learn from successes achieved by incumbents. It has a very thick tail when entry is difficult nevertheless.
This model is consistent with three Þrst-order features of the data. The economy grows at a steady rate. Firm exit rates are high for young Þrms and low for Þrms that have survived for some time. The predicted size distribution of Þrms closely approximates Zipf's law if entry is costly. This tends to be true even when the cost of entry is low in some industries.
The closed-form solutions derived in this paper rely heavily on the absence of aggregate uncertainty and on the use of steady states. This precludes an analytical treatment of transitions, and of the possible role of selection and imitation in speeding up transitions. An important abstraction also is that every Þrm is identiÞed with a technology to produce a single differentiated good. In contrast, the empirical deÞnition of a Þrm is based on the legal criterion of ownership. Building models of Þrm dynamics in which the deÞnition of a Þrm corresponds more closely to the empirical deÞnition remains an important task for further research.
In this paper, the variance of Þrm growth rates over small intervals of time is the same for Þrms of all sizes. Many studies have found larger variances for small Þrms than for large Þrms. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the presence of unobservable Þxed effects about which young Þrms learn, as proposed by Jovanovic (1982) . 21 This can be combined with the permanent shocks emphasized in this paper, although the resulting hybrid model does not appear to be analytically tractable. Pakes and Ericson (1998) derive observable implications for such a hybrid model and present evidence that the importance of learning varies across industries.
A Proof of Proposition 2
The following assumptions are maintained throughout:
Population growth is non-negative, the log productivity of incumbents does not decline on average and is stochastic, and potential entrants cannot do better than the incumbents they attempt to imitate.
A.1 Existence
It is convenient to solve for the equilibrium value of µ. The growth rates κ and θ, and the parameter ξ then follow from (6), (10) and (12) . The interest rate is given by r = ρ + γκ. The present value of the aggregate labor endowment must be Þnite in any equilibrium. Along a balanced growth path, this requires that r > κ + η. Consider stationary densities of the form (22)-(23) with α = β. The tail index α is given by (24) when δ is positive. The limit as δ approaches zero from above is α = −µ/σ 2 .
Lemma A1 If r > κ + η then α > 1 implies r − κ > µ + σ 2 /2.
This lemma ensures that the value function V (s) given in (11) is well deÞned whenever α > 1 and the present value of the aggregate labor endowment is Þnite. Under these conditions, the zero-proÞt condition (25) can be written as:
Observe that the right-hand side of (31) is decreasing in r − κ > 0 and α > 1, and increasing in ξ > 0. The deÞnition (24) implies that α is strictly decreasing in µ, with a horizontal asymptote at −1/δ for large µ. Furthermore, α can be made arbitrarily large by taking µ small enough. The condition α > 1 corresponds to µ < µ * where:
The parameter ξ deÞned in (12) depends on µ, both directly and via r − κ:
The overall dependence of ξ on µ is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma A2 If r > κ, then ξ is strictly increasing in µ for all γ ∈ (0, 1], and for all γ ∈ (1, ∞) such that:
Existence is shown separately for three possible cases, depending on the value of γ.
The Case γ = 1 This implies r − κ = ρ, and a necessary condition for a balanced growth path to exist is ρ > η. This condition is also sufficient. To see this, Þrst note from (12) and (24) that α is decreasing and ξ is increasing in µ. Furthermore, α grows without bound and ξ goes to zero as µ goes to −∞. It follows that the right-hand side of (31) is an increasing function of µ, with a vertical asymptote at µ * and a horizontal asymptote at 0.
The Case γ > 1 Note that r − κ is decreasing in µ. Assume that (34) holds. Then the right-hand side of (31) is increasing in µ as long as r > κ. As µ goes to −∞, r − κ will become large and the right-hand side of (31) goes to zero. As µ approaches µ * , the right-hand side will increase without bound as long as r > κ. It follows that the zero-proÞt condition will have a unique solution that satisÞes r > κ + η if µ < µ * implies r > κ + η. This is the case if:
There is an equilibrium if ρ is large enough to satisfy (34) and (35) .
The Case γ ∈ (0, 1) Now there is a lower bound µ * so that r > κ + η if and only if µ > µ * . A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with α = β is therefore µ * < µ * . This is guaranteed if (35) holds. As µ approaches µ * from below, α approaches 1 from above, and the right-hand side of (31) will grow without bound. This means that there exists an equilibrium for large values of λ E /λ F . It is not difficult to see that the right-hand side of (31) converges to zero as ρ grows without bound. Thus an equilibrium exists for all large enough ρ.
A.2 The Large λ E /λ F Asymptote
For any β ≥ α > 1 satisfying (23), the zero-proÞt condition is: The right-hand side of this condition is increasing in ξ, and therefore: 
in any equilibrium. If λ E /λ F goes to inÞnity, then the right-hand side of (36) must go to inÞnity as well. In any equilibrium, r −κ > η. If η > 0, then the only way the right-hand side of (36) can go to inÞnity subject to β ≥ α is for α to shrink to 1. If η = 0, then ζ > 0 if and only µ < 0. This implies κ > ϑ ≥ 0. Thus r − κ > ρ > 0. That is, in any equilibrium r − κ must be bounded away from zero. Thus α must go to one.
